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Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design
We consider the security design problem of a lender who can assess the borrower’s project
prior to making an accept or reject decision. The lender’s subjective assessment is represented
by a private signal. Unless the lender extracts the full suplus from the project, her cutoﬀ
signal above which she is willing to accept the project is ineﬃciently high, i.e., the lender is too
conservative. The unique optimal security is standard debt. Debt maximizes the lender’s payoﬀ
from financing bad–i.e., low-signal–projects, thus implementing a lower cutoﬀ signal than other
securities. While the lender could, in principle, make the loan terms indirectly contingent on
the signal by choosing a security from a prespecified menu, such ex-post fine-tuning is generally
not optimal. Rather, it is optimal to either grant credit at standardized terms or not at all. Our
model suggests a natural segmentation among lenders, whereby inside (i.e., local or relationship)
lenders attract low-NPV borrowers while arm’s-length lenders attract high-NPV borrowers.
2
1 Introduction
Technological progress notwithstanding, human judgement remains a key factor in credit deci-
sions: “[T]he credit decision is left to the local or branch lending oﬃcer or relationship manager.
Implicitly, this person’s expertise, subjective judgement, and his weighting of certain key fac-
tors are the most important determinants in the decision to grant credit” (Saunders and Allen
(2002)). In this paper, we consider the security design problem of a lender who evaluates the
borrower’s project prior to granting credit. In line we the above quote, we assume that the
lender’s assessment is subjective, which implies the credit decision is fully discretionary. Hence,
it is the lender, and only the lender, who decides whether credit is granted.1
The structure of our model is simple. The lender and borrower initially agree on a security.
The lender then scrutinizes the borrower’s project, which generates a subjective–and therefore
private–signal about the project’s cash-flow distribution. High signals are good news in the
sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). Based on the signal, the lender
either accepts or rejects the borrower. The lender’s incentives to accept the project depend on
the value of her claims, and hence on the security in place. The optimal accept or reject decision
follows a cutoﬀ rule: accept if and only if the signal is above a certain cutoﬀ signal. As we show,
the lender is generally too conservative: unless she extracts the full surplus from the project,
her privately optimal cutoﬀ signal is strictly above the first-best cutoﬀ signal. There thus exists
a range of signals at which positive-NPV projects are rejected.
The unique optimal security in our model is standard debt. To satisfy the borrower’s par-
ticipation constraint, the lender must leave the borrower a positive expected payoﬀ. Debt shifts
all of the borrower’s payoﬀs into high cash-flow states, thus maximizing the lender’s payoﬀs in
low cash-flow states. Given the positive relation between cash flows and signals due to MRLP,
debt consequently maximizes the lender’s expected payoﬀs at low signals. Accordingly, debt
minimizes the lender’s cutoﬀ signal, and hence her excessive conservativism.
In principle, the lender could make the loan terms (indirectly) contingent on her signal by
selecting a security from a prespecified menu. We show that the unique optimal menu consists
of a single security, namely, debt.2 If the lender oﬀers a nontrivial menu, she will always select
1This is in contrast to models in which borrowers have private information. In such models, the lender typically
oﬀers a menu of contracts from which the borrower chooses. The final decision is thus made by the borrower.
2This is true in our base model with fixed investment size. In an extension of our model with signal-dependent
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the security that is ex-post optimal for her. This “self-dealing” problem undermines the lender’s
commitment to leave the borrower a high expected payoﬀ at high signals, which is necessary to
satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint while maximizing her own expected payoﬀ at low
signals. In other words, it is not optimal to fine-tune the loan terms after observing the signal.
Instead, it is optimal to specify the loan terms ex ante and then accept or reject the borrower
on the basis of these terms. This might help explain the use of quantity rationing in conjunction
with standardized loan terms found in retail lending: “[L]oan decisions made for many types
of retail loans are reject or accept decisions. All borrowers who are accepted are often charged
the same rate of interest and by implication the same risk premium. [...] In the terminology of
finance, retail customers are more likely to be sorted or rationed by loan quantity restrictions
rather than by price or interest rate diﬀerences” (Saunders and Thomas (2001)).
While our argument suggests that loan terms might be insensitive with respect to interim
information, it is diﬀerent from intertemporal credit smoothing arguments. In our model, the
loan terms do not depend on subjective or private information. They do, however, incorporate
all publicly available information. By contrast, in the credit smoothing literature loan terms are
insensitive with respect to both private and public information.
Our model oﬀers a new argument for the optimality of debt based on the notion that debt
minimizes lenders’ excessive conservativism. This argument is evidently diﬀerent from costly
state verification models (Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)) and models with non-
verifiable cash flow (Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Hart and Moore (1998), DeMarzo and Fish-
man (2000)). Also, unlike in Allen and Gale (1988), risk-sharing considerations play no role
in our model. Finally, in Innes’ (1990) model the borrower must be incentivized to work hard.
By contrast, in our model the incentive problem resides with the lender, and it is a problem of
(interim) private information, not moral hazard.
In Nachman and Noe (1994), DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999), and Biais and Mariotti (2003),
the borrower is privately informed either before or after the security design. By contrast, in
our model it is the lender who has private information. And yet, in both cases the lender
receives debt. Moreover, in both cases the optimality of debt derives from the same property:
it maximizes the lender’s return from financing low-type projects. What is diﬀerent is why this
property implies optimality. In models of borrower private information, debt minimizes the
optimal investment sizes, the optimal menu is a (nontrivial) menu of debt contracts.
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sensitivity of the lender’s return with respect to the borrower’s type–and thus the underpricing
of high types (Myers and Majluf (1984)). In our model, by contrast, debt maximizes the set of
borrower types for which the lender breaks even.
Axelson (2002), Boot and Thakor (1993), and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) also consider
incentive problems on the part of investors. Axelson examines an auction model in which a seller
auctions oﬀ asset-backed securities to privately informed investors.3 The optimal security trades
oﬀ the expected underpricing against the liquidity costs of retaining cash flow. Boot and Thakor
and Fulghieri and Lukin both consider costly information acquisition. To make information
acquisition attractive for investors, firms issue information-sensitive claims like equity.
An important element of our model is the borrower’s participation constraint. To endogenize
this constraint, we embed our model in a competitive credit market where an “inside” (i.e.,
relationship or local) lender with superior but soft information competes with a less well-informed
credit market.4 If the project’s NPV based on public information is small or negative, the
insider lender can successfully compete with the market as her informational advantage allows
her to weed out bad projects. If the NPV based on public information is large, however, the
inside lender cannot compete: as the lender’s information is soft, she inevitably captures an
informational rent that prevents her from undercutting the market oﬀer. In the end, there is
a natural market segmentation among lenders, whereby inside and arm’s-length lenders coexist
by catering to diﬀerent borrower clienteles.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3
contains all our main results: (i) the lender is too conservative, (ii) the optimal security is
debt, and (iii) a menu of contracts is generally not optimal. Section 4 embeds our model in a
competitive credit market. Section 5 discusses robusteness issues, such as ex-ante negotiations,
interim renegotiations, the introduction of an additional interim constraint, and a more general
investment technology. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
3See Garmaise (2001) for a related setting.
4See Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2001), and Hauswald and Marquez (2003) for related settings.
In Boot and Thakor (2000), lenders can choose between relationship and transaction lending.
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2 The Model
2.1 Project Technology and Credit Analysis
A penniless entrepreneur (“the borrower”) has a project that requires an investment outlay k.
The project’s cash flow x is stochastic with support X := [x, x], where 0 ≤ x < k, and where x
is either finite or infinite. In our base model, we assume that there is a single lender. In Section
4, we embed our model in a competitive credit market.
Prior to financing the investment, the lender performs a credit analysis. Based on the credit
analysis, the lender forms subjective beliefs about the project’s profitability. These beliefs can be
represented by a signal s ∈ [0, 1]. As the lender’s beliefs are subjective, we assume that the signal
is private information.5 The signal is drawn from the absolutely continuous distribution function
F (s) with F (0) = 0, which is common knowledge. We assume that F (s) has positive density
f(s) everywhere in (0, 1). Each signal is associated with a conditional distribution function over
cash flows Gs(x). We assume that Gs(x) is absolutely continuous in x with Gs(x) = 0 and
density gs(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X. Moreover, gs(x) is continuous in s for all x ∈ X. The expected
project cash flow given signal s is µs :=
R
X xgs(x)dx.
Observing a high signal is good news. Precisely, high signals put more probability mass on
high cash flows in the sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP).6
Assumption 1. For any pair (s, s0) ∈ [0, 1] with s0 > s, the ratio gs0(x)/gs(x) is strictly
increasing in x for all x ∈ X.
MLRP is a common assumption in contracting models and satisfied by many standard dis-
tributions (Milgrom (1981)). To rule out trivial situations where the project’s NPV is either
always positive or negative, we assume that µ0 < k and µ1 > k.
We can think of at least two ineﬃciencies associated with the credit analysis: (i) the lender
misclassifies bad projects as good ones and vice versa, and (ii) she devotes too little eﬀort to
the analysis. The second ineﬃciency has been studied previously (e.g., Manove, Padilla, and
5A canonical example is a relationship lender with soft information about a borrower.
6The fact that the signal is informative suggests that the lender has expertise in evaluating projects, e.g.,
from having granted similar loans before (Boot and Thakor (2000)). “As a result, banks are likely to be more
knowledgeable about some aspects of project quality than many of the entrepreneurs they lend to ... This is why
banks are, and should be, in the project-evaluation business” (Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001)).
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Pagano (2001), Fulghieri and Lukin (2001)). To focus on the first ineﬃciency, we assume that
the informativeness of the signal is fixed.
2.2 Lending Process
The sequence of events is as follows. At τ = 0 the lender oﬀers a menu of contracts T := {ti}i∈I ,
where I is some index set.7 A contract ti = ti(x) in the menu specifies a repayment out of the
project’s cash flow. As the lender’s signal is private, contracts cannot directly condition on the
signal. However, the lender can make them indirectly contingent on the signal by oﬀering a
menu under which she (optimally) selects diﬀerent contracts at diﬀerent signals.
In practice, do lenders tell loan applicants “this is what you can expect if your loan gets
approved”? At least for certain types of loans this appears to be the case. At Chase Manhattan,
for instance, a major small business lender in the United States, applicants for small business
loans are shown a pricing chart explaining–depending on verifiable loan characteristics such as
size and maturity–what interest rate they will get if their loan is approved.8
While convenient, we do not need to assume that the lender makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer,
however. Given that we solve for contracts (or menus) that are Pareto optimal, we would expect
that the borrower and lender also choose such a contract if they bargain ex ante, in particular
as there is no asymmetric information at τ = 0. Also, we may allow that the borrower and
lender renegotiate the initial oﬀer after the lender has observed the signal, possibly replacing it
with an entirely diﬀerent contract or menu.9 Ex-ante bargaining and interim renegotiations are
considered in Sections 4.3 and 5.1, respectively.
At τ = 1 the lender performs the credit analysis. Based on the resulting signal, the lender
either accepts or rejects the borrower. If the lender accepts, she selects a contract from the
prespecified menu and finances the investment. Cash flows are then realized at τ = 2. If the
7This setting follows Maskin and Tirole (1992).
8A copy of such a pricing chart is available from the authors. The interest rate is defined in terms of spread
over prime, which implies it changes on a daily basis. Like any (contract) oﬀer, the extent to which the oﬀer is
credible depends on the oﬀeror’s reputation and the ability to enforce it. The loan oﬃcer we spoke to said that,
in case the loan is rejected, the original oﬀer will not be adjusted. His argument was that the profit margin on
such loans is so small that it does not pay to haggle with rejected applicants.
9Renegotiation implies a mutually beneficial change of loan terms. It does not imply that the lender can
unilaterally renege on her original oﬀer.
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lender rejects, the project is not financed. This latter assumption is endogenized in Section 4.
We make the standard assumption that the repayment ti(x) be nondecreasing in x. See see
Innes (1990) and DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999) for a motivation and further details.
Assumption 2. The contract ti(x) is nondecreasing.
The constraint that ti(x) be nondecreasing is binding at the optimum. Section 3.3 provides a
brief discussion of what the optimal contract might be in the absence of this constraint.
We assume that the menu must provide the borrower with an expected payoﬀ of V ≥ 0. For
the most part of our analysis, we take V as given and solve the model for all (feasible) values
of V , hence tracing out the entire Pareto frontier of optimal contracts (or menus, respectively).
In Section 4, we show how V might arise naturally from competition in the credit market.
We finally assume that only accepted borrowers can receive a payment from the lender. In
particular, this rules out the possibility that the lender “buys the project” before performing
the credit analysis. If upfront payments were possible, the first best could be attained without
any implications for the security design: as the purchase price is sunk, the lender has first-best
incentives to make a socially eﬃcient credit decision. The standard argument for ruling out up-
front payments is that they might attract “fly-by-night operators” (Rajan (1992), von Thadden
(1995), Hellmann (2002)).10 Rather than formally introducing such fly-by-night operators, we
assume that only accepted borrowers can receive a payment from the lender.
3 Optimal Credit Decision and Security Design
3.1 The Lender’s Problem
Instead of solving the lender’s original problem, it is convenient to solve a restricted problem
and show that its solution uniquely solves the lender’s original problem.
The lender’s original problem is to choose a menu of contracts T := {ti}i∈I while taking into
account the eﬀect of this menu on the subsequent credit decision. The lender’s optimal credit
10Fly-by-night operators are crooks who have no real project. While indistinguishable from true entrepreneurs
ex ante, their identity is revealed during the credit analysis. This can be formalized as follows: crooks generate
a signal s = 0 with certainty while true entrepreneurs generate a signal according to the distribution F (s). Since
crooks are singled out for sure at τ = 1, their (potential) presence does not aﬀect the lender’s credit decision or the
optimal security design. A positive upfront payment, however, would attract all crooks. If there is a potentially
large pool of crooks, the lender’s expected payoﬀ would become negative.
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decision is to accept the borrower if and only if the lender’s payoﬀ at the observed signal s is
positive for some contract in the menu.11 If the lender accepts, she selects the contract from
the menu that yields her the highest expected payoﬀ. The lender’s expected gross payoﬀ under
the contract ti and signal s is denoted by us (ti) :=
R
X ti(x)gs(x)dx.
The lender’s expected gross payoﬀ under the menu T and signal s is Us(T ) := maxti∈T us (ti) ,
while her net payoﬀ is Us(T )− k. To simplify the notation, we denote by Ω (T ) ⊆ [0, 1] the set
of signals for which the lender accepts under the menu T . We refer to Ω (T ) as the lender’s
acceptance set.
The lender’s original problem is as follows. At time τ = 0 the lender chooses a menu T to
maximize her expected payoﬀ
U(T ) :=
Z
Ω(T )
[Us(T )− k]f(s)ds,
where Ω (T ) := {s ∈ [0, 1]|Us(T )− k > 0} , subject to the constraint that the borrower receives
at least V in expectation,
V (T ) :=
Z
Ω(T )
[µs − Us(T )]f(s)ds ≥ V , (1)
and the requirement from Assumption 2 that ti(x) be nondecreasing.
The lender’s restricted problem is identical to her original problem, except that the menu
T is replaced with a single contract. For convenience, we use the notation t = t(x) instead of
ti(x) when considering the lender’s restricted problem. The optimization problem is the same
as above, except that T = {t} . Hence, the lender chooses a contract t = t(x) to maximize
U(t) =
Z
Ω(t)
[us(t)− k]f(s)ds,
where Ω (t) := {s ∈ [0, 1]|us(t)− k > 0} , subject to
V (t) =
Z
Ω(t)
[µs − us (t)]f(s)ds ≥ V ,
and the constraint that t(x) be nondecreasing.
The lender’s restricted problem is solved in Sections 3.2-3.3. Section 3.4 shows that the
solution to this problem uniquely solves the lender’s original problem.
11 If the lender is indiﬀerent, we assume she rejects. Since this is a zero-probability even, the assumption is
without loss of generality.
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3.2 Optimal Credit Decision
We first consider the lender’s optimal credit decision at τ = 1 given some contract t in place.
The result is a characterization of the lender’s acceptance set Ω (t) . Section 3.3 then considers
the lender’s optimal contract choice at τ = 0, while taking into account the eﬀect of t on the
lender’s credit decision.
As a benchmark, let us characterize the socially optimal–or first-best–credit decision. The
first-best decision is to accept the project if and only if the NPV conditional on s, µs − k, is
positive. Given MLRP (Assumption 1) and continuity of gs(x) in s, the conditional expected
cash flow µs is continuous and strictly increasing in s. Since µ0 < k and µ1 > k, the first-best
credit decision is characterized by a simple cutoﬀ rule:
Lemma 1. The first-best credit decision is to accept if s > sFB and to reject if s ≤ sFB. The
first-best cutoﬀ signal sFB is unique, satisfies sFB ∈ (0, 1) , and is given by µsFB = k.
At the optimal cutoﬀ signal sFB the expected project cash flow conditional on s, µs, equals
the investment cost k. If s < sFB the expected project cash flow is less than k; if s > sFB it
exceeds k. Hence, the first-best credit decision is the NPV rule, which prescribes to accept the
project if and only if the project’s NPV conditional on the signal is positive.12
We next consider the lender’s privately optimal credit decision. The lender accepts the
project if and only if her expected payoﬀ at the given signal, us (t) − k, is positive. Like the
first-best decision, the lender’s privately optimal decision is given by a cutoﬀ rule: accept the
project if and only if s > s∗, where s∗ = s∗(t) is the lender’s optimal cutoﬀ signal.
Lemma 2. The lender’s optimal credit decision is to accept if s > s∗ and to reject if s ≤ s∗.
If u1(t) ≤ k the lender’s cutoﬀ signal is s∗ = 1, while if u1(t) > k the lender’s cutoﬀ signal is
unique, satisfies s∗ ∈ (0, 1) , and is given by us∗(t) = k.
Proof. See Appendix.
If s > s∗ the lender makes a profit, while if s < s∗ she makes a loss, which implies she
optimally rejects. Hence, the lender’s acceptance set Ω (t) is an interval: Ω (t) = (s∗, 1] . By
Lemma 1, the first-best acceptance set is also an interval, namely, ΩFB = (sFB, 1].
12 If the NPV is exactly zero, we specify that the project be rejected. Since s = sFB is a zero-probability event,
this assumption is without loss of generality.
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We next establish whether the lender’s privately optimal cutoﬀ signal s∗ lies above or below
the first-best cutoﬀ signal sFB. If u1(t) ≤ k the lender’s cutoﬀ signal is s∗ = 1, which is evidently
above the first-best cutoﬀ signal. If u1(t) > k, on the other hand, the lender’s cutoﬀ signal is
given by us∗(t) = k. Since t(x) ≤ x, we have that
usFB (t) =
Z
X
t(x)gsFB (x)dx ≤
Z
X
xgsFB(x)dx = µsFB = k,
with strict inequality if and only if t(x) < x on sets of positive measure. Accordingly, if t(x) = x
the lender (just) breaks even at s = sFB, implying that s∗ = sFB. On the other hand, if t(x) < x
the lender does not break even at s = sFB. As–by Assumptions 1 and 2 and continuity of
gs(x)–the lender’s conditional expected payoﬀ us(t)− k is strictly increasing in s, her optimal
cutoﬀ signal s∗ must consequently lie strictly above sFB, i.e., s∗ > sFB. We thus have
Proposition 1. Unless the lender can extract the full surplus, her credit decision is too conser-
vative, i.e., her cutoﬀ signal s∗ lies strictly above the first-best cutoﬀ signal sFB.
At marginal signals s ∈ [sFB, s∗), the lender’s conditional expected payoﬀ is negative. To
implement the social optimum, one would have to force the lender to occasionally finance a
project under which she does not break even.
The argument that the lender is too conservative is fairly general and does not hinge on
Assumptions 1 and 2. In particular, it does not hinge on the assumption that t(x) be nonde-
creasing. This follows from the fact that us(t) < µs for all s ≤ 1 if t(x) < x on sets of positive
measure. Hence, if at some signal s = sˆ it holds that usˆ(t) > k, it must also hold that µsˆ > k,
but not vice versa. In words: if the lender’s optimal credit decision prescribes to accept the
project, the first-best credit decision also prescribes to accept. The reverse is not true, however.
Hence, even without Assumptions 1 and 2, the lender is too conservative in the sense that her
acceptance set Ω (t) is strictly smaller than the first-best acceptance set ΩFB. Assumptions 1
and 2 merely ensure that the acceptance sets are connected, in which case both the first-best
credit decision and the lender’s privately optimal credit decision are characterized by simple
cutoﬀ rules.13 “Being too conservative” then has the intuitive interpretation that the lender
uses too high a cutoﬀ signal.
13While the result that the lender is too conservative holds independently of Assumptions 1 and 2, these
assumptions are crucial for the optimal security design in Section 3.3, however.
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3.3 Optimal Security Design
We now solve the lender’s optimal security design problem at τ = 0. Given Lemma 2, the
lender’s restricted problem reduces to maximizing
U(t) =
Z 1
s∗(t)
[us (t)− k]f(s)ds, (2)
subject to
V (t) =
Z 1
s∗(t)
[µs − us (t)]f(s)ds ≥ V , (3)
and the constraint that t(x) be nondecreasing.
By standard arguments, (3) must bind at the optimum. Substituting the binding constraint
into the lender’s objective function (2), the latter becomes
U(t) =
Z 1
s∗(t)
[µs − k]f(s)ds− V . (4)
By inspection, the lender is the residual claimant to any surplus in excess of V . Moreover, the
only way in which t(x) aﬀects the lender’s expected payoﬀ is via its impact on the optimal cutoﬀ
signal s∗(t). By implication, the lender will therefore design a contract that implements as low
as possible a cutoﬀ signal, and thus as eﬃcient as possible a credit decision.
There are two cases. If V = 0, the lender obtains the full surplus. The optimal contract then
trivially has t(x) = x, and the credit decision is first-best eﬃcient. If V > 0, on the other hand,
it holds that t(x) < x on sets of positive measure. By Proposition 1, the credit decision is then
ineﬃcient. As a claimant to the residual surplus, the lender chooses t = t(x) to minimize this
ineﬃciency. Accordingly, she chooses the contract that implements the lowest feasible cutoﬀ
signal s∗(t).
Clearly, if V is too large the lender cannot break even. In all other cases, a nontrivial
contract under which the borrower is accepted with positive probability exists. In the following,
we assume that V is suﬃciently small in the above sense. (We consider the case where V is “too
large” in our competition model in Section 4.) We obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. The unique optimal security is standard debt. Precisely, there exists a unique
repayment R∗ = R∗(V ) > k such that the unique optimal security is t∗(x) = min {x,R∗} .
If V = 0 the optimal repayment is R∗ = x, which implies the lender’s credit decision is
first-best optimal. Conversely, if V > 0 the optimal repayment satisfies R∗ < x, which implies
the lender’s cutoﬀ signal s∗ lies strictly above the first-best cutoﬀ signal sFB.
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Proof. See Appendix.
If V = 0, the optimal contract can be either interpreted as 100 percent equity or debt with
face value R = x. If V > 0, on the other hand, the uniquely optimal security is debt. The
intuition is simple. To satisfy the borrower’s ex-ante participation constraint (3), the lender
must leave him a positive expected payoﬀ.14 Debt shifts all of the borrower’s payoﬀ into high
cash-flow states, thus maximizing the lender’s payoﬀ in low cash-flow states. Given the positive
relation between cash flows and signals (by MRLP), debt maximizes the lender’s expected payoﬀ
at low signals. Debt consequently implements a lower cutoﬀ signal s∗(t) than any other security,
thus minimizing the lender’s excessive conservativism.
The proof of Proposition 2 points to an easy-to-make mistake when thinking about possible
alternative solution candidates. It is easy to find a contract that–holding the cutoﬀ signal s∗
fixed–yields both the lender and the borrower the same expected payoﬀ as the optimal debt
contract. The (incorrect) conclusion is that debt is not uniquely optimal. What is incorrect
about this conclusion is that any such contract will actually implement a higher cutoﬀ signal
than debt. Hence, the thought exercise of holding s∗ fixed is illegitimate.
Let us finally comment on what the optimal contract might look like in the absence of
Assumption 2. In the absence of a monotonicity constraint, a “live-or-die” (LD) contract
tLD(x) = x if x ≤ ex and tLD(x) = 0 if x > ex provides the lender with a higher expected
payoﬀ than debt at low signals. The flip side is that it provides the lender with a lower expected
payoﬀ at high signals. If the lender’s expected payoﬀ us(tLD)− k remains positive at high sig-
nals, standard arguments can be used to show that LD is uniquely optimal. On the other hand,
if us(tLD)− k turns negative at high signals, LD–while maximizing the acceptance probability
at low signals–makes the lender reject the project at high signals. The optimal nonmonotonic
contract then depends on the underlying probability distributions.
3.4 Menu of Contracts
We finally show that it is suboptimal to oﬀer a menu of contracts, which implies the solution to
the lender’s restricted problem constitutes the unique solution to her original problem.
Oﬀering a menu creates a “self-dealing” problem: if the lender oﬀered a menu, she would
14This highlights the importance of the ex-ante participation constraint (3), which is critical for our debt result.
See Section 4 for an endogenization of this constraint and Section 5.2 for a further discussion of this issue.
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always pick the contract that is ex-post optimal for her. In particular, at high signals she would
not pick the optimal debt contract t∗ but some other contract that oﬀers her a greater fraction
of high cash flows, e.g., a contract that is more “equity-like”. To ensure that the borrower
obtains V in expectation, the menu must consequently also include contracts that provide the
lender with a relatively low payoﬀ at low signals (and that are actually chosen by the lender at
these signals). But this implies that the menu must implement a higher cutoﬀ signal than the
(single) optimal debt contract t∗. By restricting her choice to a single contract–namely, the
optimal debt contract–the lender can thus commit to a lower cutoﬀ signal. This maximizes the
acceptance probability, which is the most eﬃcient way to satisfy the borrower’s participation
constraint (3).
Proposition 3. The unique optimal menu consists of a single contract : the optimal debt con-
tract from Proposition 2. Any other menu either violates the borrower’s participation constraint
or implements a higher cutoﬀ signal.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that it is not optimal to ex-post fine tune the loan terms by selecting
diﬀerent contracts at diﬀerent signals. Rather, it is optimal to oﬀer a single contract and
either accept or reject the borrower on the basis of this contract. While this implies that
loan terms are insensitive with respect to interim information, it does not imply that they
are insensitive with respect to project risk in general. Precisely, borrowers with diﬀerent prior
distributions F (s)–and hence diﬀerent ex-ante expected cash flows–naturally obtain diﬀerent
loan terms. Similarly, the optimal contract varies with respect to investment size and other
ex-ante characteristics. Moreover, such ex-ante characteristics aﬀect the optimal contract both
directly as well as indirectly via their impact on the borrower’s reservation utility V . In Section
4, for instance, we show that in a competitive credit market V depends on the project’s ex-ante
expected cash flow.
Proposition 3 suggests that, once borrowers are grouped into diﬀerent categories, any further
discrimination based on interim information (here: the signal s) is crude and comes in the
form of an accept or reject decision. This is consistent with the notion that in retail lending
accepted borrowers are commonly either granted credit at prespecified terms or not at all (see
Introduction). It is also consistent with Petersen and Rajan’s (1994) finding that the rate charged
on small-business loans is generally insensitive with respect to measures of interim information
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about a borrower, while the availability of credit is sensitive with respect to such measures.
Let us conclude by pointing out that the optimality of a single contract depends on a number
of (restrictive) assumptions, most notably the assumption that the investment size k is fixed. If
the optimal investment size varies with the lender’s signal, for instance, a single contract might
not be optimal. For a formal analysis of this case, see Section 5.3.
4 Credit Market Competition
4.1 Relationship vs. Arm’s-Length Lending
To endogenize the borrower’s reservation utility V–and thus his ex-ante participation constraint
(3)–we now embed our model in a competitive credit market environment. There are two
types of lenders. There is an “inside lender” (“the lender”) who observes a private signal s in
addition to publicly available information. Additionally, there is a competitive credit market
(“the market”) without access to the private signal. While stylized, we believe this setting
captures some key aspects of real-world lending situations, especially small business lending.15
The literature oﬀers two arguments as to what makes up an inside lender: existing lending
relationships and proximity to the borrower.16 Lending relationships might give lenders better
access to soft information, e.g., through personal contacts with management and employees.
Relationship lenders also interact with borrowers through other channels, e.g., borrowers often
maintain checking and savings accounts with their lender, or the lender factors the borrower’s
accounts receivables. Such additional channels “increase the precision of the lender’s information
about the borrower” (Petersen and Rajan (1994)). In this spirit, Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992),
and von Thadden (2001)–like this paper–all consider a single relationship lender with a private
signal about the borrower’s quality who competes with an uninformed credit market.17 As for
supporting evidence, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that 95 percent of the smallest firms in
their (small business loan) sample borrow from a single bank. Across their entire sample, only
18 percent borrow from more than one bank.
15Besides, having a single informed lender greatly simplifies our analysis. If there are multiple informed lenders,
each with a private, imperfectly correlated signal, the analysis becomes significantly more complex. (See also
Section 4.3.) We cannot, and do not want to, speculate what the optimal security might be in this case.
16For a survey of the relationship lending literature, see Boot (2000).
17For a similar setup, see also Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2003).
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As for geographical proximity, a lender in close proximity to a borrower might have better
knowledge of local conditions, which puts her in a better position to evaluate the borrower’s
project. With regard to small business lending, Petersen and Rajan (2002) (for the United
States) and Degryse and Ongena (2003) (for Belgium) find that the median distance between
banks and borrowers is four and 1.4 miles, respectively, suggesting that small business lending
might be locally segmented. Relatedly, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) argue that there
is “direct evidence of the informational disadvantage of distant lenders in Italy”. In this spirit,
and similar to our paper, Hauswald and Marquez (2002) assume that the lender that is closest
to a borrower has a more informative signal than more distant lenders.
The timing is as follows. The lender and the market make oﬀers at τ = 0.18 If the borrower
goes to the lender, the lender performs a credit analysis and accepts or rejects the borrower
based on her signal. At τ = 1 an accepted borrower can either stay with the lender or visit the
credit market. If the borrower was rejected, his only option is to visit the market. Cash flows
are realized at τ = 2.
For technical reasons, we assume that the market can distinguish between “fresh” borrowers
and borrowers who have been previously screened. Without this assumption, there exists no
pure-strategy equilibrium (e.g., von Thadden (2001), Hauswald and Marquez (2003)). Hence,
the borrower may solicit oﬀers from both the lender and the market at τ = 0. If he visits the
market after he has been screened, however, the market might make him a diﬀerent oﬀer. In
practice, potential lenders would usually check a borrower’s credit history before making a loan.
In most countries, including the United States, credit bureaus provide this information in the
form of credit reports. Such credit reports commonly also show whether other lenders have made
similar inquiries in the past, including the date of the inquiry and the identity of the inquirer
(Jappelli and Pagano (2002)).19 To the extent that lenders have access to this information, they
can see whether a borrower has recently sought credit, and whether he sought credit from a
18To ensure that the market does not fall prey to “fly-by-night operators” (see Section 2.2), we could assume
that the market does not oﬀer any upfront payments. Since fly-by-night operators generate a cash flow of x = 0 for
sure, their expected payoﬀ is then zero. Alternatively, we might assume that both the lender and the market can
filter out crooks, but the lender has a more precise signal about “real” borrowers. Suppose all investors observe
two signals. The (informed) lender observes a public signal at τ = 0 and a private signal s at τ = 1, where s = 0
if the borrower is a crook. The market observes a public signal at τ = 0 and a second signal σ at τ = 1. If the
borrower is a crook, the second signal is σ = 0, otherwise it is identical to the first (i.e., public) signal.
19Jappelli and Pagano provide a copy of an actual credit report containing this (and other) information.
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local or a distant lender.
4.2 Equilibrium Analysis
The project’s ex-ante NPV–i.e., the NPV based on publicly available information alone–is
µ :=
Z 1
0
(µs − k)f (s) ds. (5)
At τ = 0 the market can oﬀer the borrower an expected payoﬀ of max{0, µ}. On the other hand,
the maximum expected payoﬀ that the informed lender can oﬀer the borrower is
Vmax := max
t
Z 1
s∗
[µs − us(t)]f(s)ds, (6)
subject to us∗(t) = k (Lemma 2), where t is a debt contract. The restriction to debt contracts
follows from Proposition 2.
The competition model has a unique equilibrium: at τ = 0 the borrower either visits the
lender or the market, depending on the relative magnitudes of µ and Vmax. At τ = 1 an accepted
borrower stays with the lender, while a rejected borrower cannot obtain financing elsewhere.
Proposition 4. The competition model has a unique equilibrium. There are two cases :
i) Case 1: Vmax > µ. The inside lender oﬀers the optimal debt contract from Proposition 2,
whereby V = max{0, µ}. The borrower goes to the inside lender, which provides him with an
expected payoﬀ of V . The lender finances the borrower if s ≥ s∗ and rejects him if s < s∗. A
rejected borrower cannot obtain financing elsewhere.
ii) Case 2: Vmax < µ. The borrower goes to the credit market, which provides him with an
expected payoﬀ of µ.
Proof. See Appendix.20
Consider first Case 1. At τ = 0 the lender’s ability to make an informed decision allows her
to undercut the market. By standard arguments, the unique equilibrium is to exactly match
the market oﬀer max{0, µ}. At τ = 1 the market cannot oﬀer more than max{0, µ}.21 As the
expected payoﬀ of an accepted borrower exceeds max{0, µ}, he optimally stays with the lender.
But if all accepted borrowers stay with the lender, rejected borrowers cannot obtain financing
20 If Vmax = µ there are two equilibrium outcomes: the borrower either visits the lender or the market.
21A market oﬀer of max{0, µ} is sustainable only under the “most optimistic beliefs” that–in addition to all
rejected borrowers–also all accepted borrowers visit the market at τ = 1.
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from the market as their conditional NPV
R s∗
0 (µs−k)f(s)/F (s∗)ds is negative. This endogenizes
an assumption made in Section 2.2 that a rejected project will not be financed.
Proposition 4 also endogenizes the borrower’s reservation utility as V = max{0, µ}. If µ ≤ 0
the borrower cannot obtain financing from the market, which implies the lender can extract the
full surplus. In contrast, if µ > 0 there is true competition. As the project is already viable
on the basis of public information alone, the lender must give the borrower the full ex-ante
NPV µ to match the market oﬀer. Note that, even if projects are viable on the basis of public
information, the lender performs a valuable task by filtering out bad projects. The easiest way
to see this is by looking at the lender’s and borrower’s combined profits µ+ U(t) : as U(t) > 0,
the lender’s screening activity has generated surplus in addition to the ex-ante NPV µ.22
In Case 2, the ex-ante NPV is so high that the lender cannot compete. The borrower conse-
quently visits the credit market, where he extracts the full ex-ante NPV µ.23 As an illustration,
consider the limit case where sFB = 0. To oﬀer the borrower the full ex-ante NPV, the lender
would have to accept the project for all signals s > 0. But this is impossible: the lender sets
s∗ = sFB = 0 only if she extracts the full surplus; but then she cannot promise the borrower
anything. Conversely, if the borrower gets just a tiny fraction of the surplus, the lender optimally
sets s∗ > sFB = 0. Intuitively, if sFB = 0 there are no bad projects. Absent any value added,
the only way the lender can oﬀer the borrower the full ex-ante NPV is by making zero profits
herself. But this is impossible, as the lender earns an information rent of U(t) > 0 due to the
discretionary nature of her accept or reject decision.
Clearly, it is desirable to express the choice between Case 1 and Case 2 in terms of model
primitives, e.g., in terms of the investment cost k. Suppose k can vary between k = µ0 and
k = µ1. Everything else equal, borrowers with a low k have a high ex-ante NPV and are likely to
break even, while borrowers with a high k are less likely to break even. It is easy to show that if k
is suﬃciently large Case 1 applies, while if k is suﬃciently small Case 2 applies. For intermediate
k−values further assumptions are needed, however, since µ− Vmax may have multiple points of
zero. It is relatively easy, however, to construct numerical examples in which all borrowers above
a certain cutoﬀ-NPV visit the credit market while all borrowers below the cutoﬀ visit the lender.
Consider the following example.
22Precisely, it is not the lender’s screening activity per se that generates surplus, but the fact that rejected
projects disappear from the market.
23This is the case where V is “too large” that we have ruled out in Section 3.3.
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Example. Suppose the project cash flow is exponentially distributed over x ≥ 0 with CDF
Gs(x) = 1− e−(S−s)x and density gs(x) = (S−s)e−(S−s)x, where S > 1. The expected cash flow
conditional on s is then µs = 1/(S − s). To ensure that sFB lies in the interior of s, we assume
that 1/S < k < 1/(S − 1), which implies that sFB = S − 1/k. The signal distribution F (s) is
uniform over S := [0, 1].
Appendix B shows the derivation of all the main formulas in this section for the above
specifications of Gs(x) and F (s). The ex-ante project NPV is µ = ln
³
S
S−1
´
−k, which implies it
is fully characterized by two parameters: the investment cost k and the distributional parameter
S. Holding S constant, a lower value of k implies a higher ex-ante NPV. Conversely, holding
k constant, a lower value of S implies a “better” conditional cash-flow distribution Gs(x) in
the sense of MLRP, and therefore a higher ex-ante NPV. Consequently, the ex-ante NPV µ is
strictly decreasing in both k and S. Likewise, the maximum utility that the lender can oﬀer the
borrower, Vmax, is strictly decreasing in both k and S.
Figure 1 here
Figure 1a plots µ and Vmax for diﬀerent values of k, while Figure 1b plots µ and Vmax for
diﬀerent values of S. In both cases, µ and Vmax cross exactly once such that Case 1 in Proposition
4 applies if and only if k or S is suﬃciently large. End.
With the usual degree of caution, we might summarize our results as follows: informed (i.e.,
relationship or local) lenders tend to be segmented towards borrowers who–if evaluated solely
on the basis of hard, public information–are less likely to break even, and where additional, dis-
cretionary information is particularly valuable (Proposition 4, Case 1). Conversely, uninformed,
arm’s-length lenders tend to be segmented towards “safe” borrowers who are likely to break
even in the first place, e.g., big firms with a good credit rating (Case 2).
Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that more transparent firms and firms with a good credit
quality are indeed more likely to borrow at arm’s length. Similarly, Denis and Mihov (2003) find
that profitable firms with a high credit quality are more likely to tap public debt markets, while
less profitable firms tend to borrow more from banks. Relatedly, Cole, Goldberg, and White
(1999) document that big banks tend to approve loans primarily on the basis of hard infor-
mation such as financial statements, while small banks are more likely to use soft information.
Accordingly, big banks tend to act more as arm’s-length lenders while small banks tend to act
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more as relationship lenders. Consistent with our stylized picture, Berger et. al (2004) find that
big banks are more apt to lend at a distance and to firms that are financially more transparent,
while Haynes, Ou, and Berney (1999) find that big banks tend to lend more to financially secure
firms.
4.3 Discussion
Ex-ante Negotiations
Our qualitative results remain the same if–instead of the lender making a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer–the borrower and lender bargain over a menu of contracts. The only diﬀerence is that
instead of merely matching the competitive market oﬀer, the lender must oﬀer the borrower the
competitive market oﬀer plus a bargaining premium.
As ex-ante negotiations take place under symmetric information, it is reasonable to assume
that the borrower and lender select a point on the Pareto frontier. We have already derived
the Pareto frontier by maximizing the lender’s expected payoﬀ subject to fixing the borrower’s
expected utility at V ∈ [0, Vmax]. For each such V , denote the optimal debt contract and the
lender’s expected payoﬀ by t∗(V ) and U(V ) := u(t∗(V )), respectively. Following a standard
convention in bargaining theory, we assume that the Pareto frontier is smooth and concave.24
We use the Nash bargaining solution. Accordingly, the borrower and lender choose a pair
(V ,U(V )) maximizing the Nash product (V − Vˆ )b(U(V )− Uˆ)1−b, where 0 < b < 1 reflects the
borrower’s bargaining power, Vˆ = max{0, µ} denotes the borrower’s outside option, and Uˆ = 0
denotes the lender’s outside option. The solution is given by the first-order condition
b
1− b = −U
0(V )
V −max{0, µ}
U(V )
. (7)
Equation (7) presumes the existence of a point (V ,U(V )) on the Pareto frontier with the property
that V > max{0, µ} and U(V ) > 0. Such a point exists if and only if Case 1 in Proposition 4
applies. Moreover, if b→ 0 the solution to (7) converges to our previous solution V = max{0, µ}.
The following result is obvious.
Proposition 5. Suppose the inside lender and the borrower bargain over a menu of contracts
ex ante, where the outcome is determined by the Nash bargaining solution.
24Concavity of the Pareto frontier can be ensured by introducing lotteries over contracts.
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i) If Vmax > µ Case 1 in Proposition 4 applies. The only diﬀerence is that the borrower’s
expected payoﬀ V lies above the competitive market oﬀer max{0, µ}, where the “bargaining
premium” V −max{0, µ} is increasing in the borrower’s bargaining power b.
ii) If Vmax < µ, the lender and borrower cannot reach an agreement, and Case 2 applies.
Informed Lending as a Monopoly?
Like Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004), and others, we have
assumed that there is a single informed lender competing with an uninformed credit market.
In models of relationship lending, this information monopoly derives from the assumption that
at the beginning of a firm’s history, the firm finances its first-period project through a single
lender.25 Due to the soft information acquired in this period, the initial lender obtains (and
retains) an informational advantage in all following periods.26 The empirical findings by Petersen
and Rajan (1994) that 82 percent of the firms in their sample borrow from a single bank (95
percent if they consider only the smallest firms in their sample) suggests that the notion of a
single inside lender is not unreasonable.
Alternatively, the inside lender’s advantage might derive from geographical proximity to the
borrower. In this case, a local monopoly might arise from a fixed cost of establishing a local
presence. As an illustration, consider the case of two local lenders with perfectly correlated,
yet nonverifiable signals. This case is analyzed in, e.g., von Thadden (1994) and Hauswald and
Marquez (2003). As each lender knows the other lender’s signal, Bertrand competition at τ = 1
drives profits to zero. Given the fixed cost, there exist pure-strategy equilibria where only one
of the two lenders enters. If the two signals are not perfectly correlated, the analysis becomes
significantly more diﬃcult as competition at τ = 1 takes place under asymmetric information.27
25Rajan (1992, Section IV.B) briefly discusses the case where the firm can initially borrow from multiple banks.
26“In the process of this monitoring, the lender learns more about the success of the firm’s operation than
do outside banks. As a result, the original lender should be in a better position to evaluate the firm’s future
performance” (Sharpe, 1990)).
27 In Thakor (1996) signals are uncorrelated across lenders. As there are only two signals, all lenders who accept
the borrower have the same (namely, high) signal, however. Given that all lenders know how many other lenders
have accepted the borrower, competition takes place under symmetric information. Just like in the case where
signals are perfectly correlated, competing banks thus make zero profits. In our model, there is a continuum of
signals and signals are private. Hence, even if a lender knew how many other lenders have accepted, she would
not know their signals–and hence their valuations–unless signals were perfectly correlated.
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Even in a setting with two cash flows, two signals, and no security design, pure-strategy equilibria
may not exist (Broecker (1990)). While it may still be true that a high fixed cost can create a
monopoly, a formal analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Robustness
5.1 Renegotiations
Under the optimal contract, the borrower is rejected at marginal signals s ∈ (sFB, s∗) even
though the project has a positive NPV. This potentially provides scope for renegotiations: to
make the project more attractive for the lender, the borrower might accept less favorable loan
terms, e.g., a higher repayment R. This is what would happen if s were jointly observable by
the borrower and lender. As s is private information, however, the borrower does not know if
the true signal is s ∈ (sFB, s∗), in which case he might accept new loan terms, or if s > s∗, in
which case changing the loan terms would merely constitute a wealth transfer to the lender. A
necessary condition for the borrower to accept a new contract t is therefore that t implements a
lower cutoﬀ signal, i.e., s∗(t) < s∗(t∗). However, such a contract would make the lender not only
better oﬀ at marginal signals s ∈ (s∗(t), s∗(t∗)] but also at higher signals s ≥ s∗(t∗).28 Hence,
the lender has every incentive to claim that s ∈ (sFB, s∗) even if the true signal is s ≥ s∗(t∗).
As Proposition 6 shows, this conflict of objectives implies that the optimal contract t∗ will not
be renegotiated in equilibrium.
We consider the following model of renegotiation. After the signal has been realized either the
borrower or the lender can oﬀer a new contract t.29 The oﬀer must be accepted by the respective
counterparty; otherwise the optimal contract t∗ remains in eﬀect. We have the following result.
Proposition 6. In any (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of the renegotiation game, the unique
optimal debt contract from Proposition 2 is not renegotiated. This holds irrespective of whether
the borrower or the lender can oﬀer a new contract at the interim stage.
Proof. See Appendix.
28Since t∗ is standard debt, any nondecreasing contract t 6= t∗ that is preferred by the lender must award the
lender a greater fraction of high cash flows. The rest of the argument follows then immediately from MLRP.
29The argument trivially extends to the case where the borrower and lender can oﬀer menus of contracts.
22
5.2 Interim Constraint
The optimality of debt derives from the fact that the lender must satisfy the borrower’s ex-
ante participation constraint (3). If there was no ex-ante constraint but, say, only an interim
constraint, our arguments would generally not apply.30 Section 4 shows how the ex-ante partic-
ipation constraint might arise naturally from competition in the credit market: to attract the
borrower in the first place, the lender must oﬀer him V = max{0, µ}.
In the following, we examine to what extent our results are preserved if we additionally
introduce an interim constraint. We consider two possible sources for an interim constraint: a
wage from outside employment and an agency rent due to ex-post moral hazard.
Outside Employment Opportunity
Suppose the borrower has an outside employment opportunity, both at τ = 0 and τ = 1,
oﬀering him a wage w > 0. His ex-ante participation constraint (3) is thenZ 1
s∗(t)
[µs − us (t)]f(s)ds+ F (s∗)w ≥ V + w, (8)
where V is the borrower’s rent on top of w.
The possibility of an outside wage creates an interim participation constraintZ 1
s∗(t)
[µs − us (t)]
f(s)
1− F (s∗)ds ≥ w, (9)
where f(s)/[1 − F (s∗)] is the posterior probability of s given that s ≥ s∗. By inspection, (8)
implies (9). In fact, if V > 0 (9) is slack.
Even though (9) never binds, introducing an outside wage has a nontrivial eﬀect as it also
enters into the first best. Precisely, the first-best cutoﬀ signal is now given by µsFB = w + k.
The lender’s optimal cutoﬀ signal, on the other hand, is (still) given by us∗(t) = k, since part of
the “real opportunity cost”, w, is borne by the borrower.
On the one hand, the lender must leave the borrower a rent V , which tends to make her
too conservative. This is our previously studied eﬀect. On the other hand, the lender does not
bear the full opportunity cost, which makes her too lenient. This second eﬀect may (partly)
oﬀset the first. In fact, if w is suﬃciently large, the first best can be attained. If w increases
beyond this point, the lender’s cutoﬀ signal under the optimal debt contract would drop below
30This is true for our base model. In our extension with moral hazard, debt is optimal regardless of whether
the ex-ante or interim constraint binds. See the end of Section 5.2 for a brief discussion.
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sFB. To remain at the first best, the lender must consequently adjust the optimal contract.
One way–but not the only way–of doing this is to oﬀer a debt contract and pay the borrower
a fixum of W if the project is financed. One interpretation of this contract is that the lender
provides funds of k +W but only k is invested in the project. When the project cash flow is
realized the borrower can pay himself a wage W, while the lender holds a debt contract on the
cash flow. The proof of the following proposition is immediate given our previous results.
Proposition 7. Suppose the borrower has an alternative employment opportunity oﬀering him
a wage of w > 0. If w is suﬃciently small compared to V , our previous results continue to hold,
i.e., s∗ > sFB and the unique optimal security is debt. Otherwise, the first best can be attained,
e.g., with t(x) = −W +max{x,R} with W ≤ w, in which case the lender holds a debt contract
and the borrower receives an additional wage W if the project is undertaken.
Hence, it is crucial for our debt result that the borrower extracts a rent V on top of w.
Merely requiring that he be compensated for his forgone wage w is–absent any rent extraction–
insuﬃcient. In our basic competition model (Sections 4.1 - 4.2), for instance, we have V =
max {0, µ− w} , which implies we need µ > w for our debt result to hold. If the borrower has
additionally some bargaining power (Section 4.3), we have V > max {0, µ− w}. In this case,
our debt result may hold even if µ < w.
Ex-post Borrower Moral Hazard
Suppose after the project is financed but before cash flows are realized, the borrower can
exert a noncontractible eﬀort e ∈ {el, eh}. Low eﬀort is costless while high eﬀort involves a
private cost c > 0. By assumption, it is always eﬃcient to implement the high eﬀort. The
conditional cash-flow distribution is G(x | s, e), which is assumed to be additively separable of
the form G(x | s, e) = H1(x | s) +H2(x | e) with corresponding densities g, h1, and h2. Hence,
the marginal productivity of e is independent of s.31 The conditional expected cash flow and the
lender’s conditional expected payoﬀ are µ(s, e) and u(t | s, e), respectively.
31Given the assumptions in this section, we can restrict ourselves to single contracts. Absent any productive
interaction between e and s, the only implication of a menu (where each contract in the menu implements high
eﬀort) would be that the lender always picks the contract that minimizes the borrower’s agency rent (see Section
3.4 for a related argument). But for any such menu, the lender can implement the same expected agency rent
with a single contract. This logic extends to more than two eﬀort levels provided the lender wants to implement
the same eﬀort for all signals. Otherwise a menu of incentive contracts might be optimal.
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We assume that high eﬀort generates a “better” cash-flow distribution in the sense of MLRP.
Assumption 1 is thus replaced by
Assumption 1a. For any pair (s, s0) ∈ [0, 1] with s0 > s and any e ∈ {el, eh), the ratio g(x |
s0, e)/g(x | s0, e) is strictly increasing in x, while for any s ∈ [0, 1] the ratio g(x | s, eh)/g(x | s, el)
is strictly increasing in x.
The first-best cutoﬀ signal is unique and given by µ(sFB, eh) = k + c. Similarly, if we rule
out the trivial case where the lender always rejects, the lender’s unique optimal cutoﬀ signal is
given by u(t | s∗, eh) = k.
The lender’s problem is as follows. The lender chooses a contract t to maximize
U(t) :=
Z 1
s∗
[u(t | s, eh)− k]f(s)ds (10)
subject to the borrower’s ex-ante participation constraintZ 1
s∗
[µ(s, eh)− u(t | s, eh)− c] f(s)ds ≥ V , (11)
and his (interim) incentive-compatibility constraintZ 1
s∗
[µ(s, eh)− u(t | s, eh)] f(s)
1− F (s∗)ds− c ≥
Z 1
s∗
[µ(s, el)− u(t | s, el)] f(s)
1− F (s∗)ds, (12)
where f(s)/[1−F (s∗)] is the posterior probability of s given that s ≥ s∗. Recall that the borrower
does not know the true signal–and thus his actual agency rent–but only that s ≥ s∗.
Consider the borrower’s moral hazard problem in isolation. Given that G(x | s, e) = H1(x |
s) +H2(x | e), we can rewrite (12) asZ
X
[x− t(x)]h2(x | eh)dx− c ≥
Z
X
[x− t(x)]h2(x | el)dx. (13)
Accordingly, the borrower’s incentive-compatibility constraint–and thus the optimal incentive
contract–is independent of s or s∗. Given Assumptions 1a and 2, the unique optimal incentive
contract is a call option, which implies t(x) is standard debt. Intuitively, a call option maximizes
the borrower’s payoﬀ in high cash-flow states (subject to Assumption 2), and thus precisely in
those states where the likelihood ratio is highest, i.e., states that are most informative about
high eﬀort.32
32This line of argument follows Innes (1990).
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Consider now the lender’s overall problem (10)-(12). Given that t(x) is debt, there exists a
unique repayment R1 defined by the binding interim constraint (13). This is the repayment the
lender would require if there was no ex-ante constraint. Inserting R1 in (12), the borrower then
obtains an expected (from a τ = 0 perspective) agency rent ofZ 1
s∗(R1)
[µ(s, el)− u(R1 | s, el)] f(s)ds. (14)
If (14) exceeds V , the solution to the lender’s overall problem is to oﬀer a debt contract
with repayment R1. In this case, the interim constraint (12) binds while the ex-ante constraint
(11) is slack. Conversely, if V exceeds (14), the expected agency rent is insuﬃcient to satisfy
the borrower’s ex-ante participation constraint. The lender must consequently lower R, which
renders the interim constraint (12) slack. By Proposition 1, the unique optimal solution in this
case is a debt contract with repayment R∗ such that (11) is satisfied with equality. Overall,
the borrower’s expected rent is the maximum of (14) and V . Hence, irrespective of whether the
interim or ex-ante constraint binds, it holds that s∗ > sFB.
Proposition 8. The unique optimal solution to the lender’s problem with ex-post borrower
moral hazard is to oﬀer a standard debt contract. The optimal repayment is determined either
by (11) or (12), depending on which constraint binds. In either case, it holds that s∗ > sFB.
Proof. See Appendix.
The fact that debt is optimal even when the ex-ante participation constraint (11) is slack
depends on the specific structure of the moral hazard problem, especially Assumption 1a and
the fact that G(x | s, e) is additively separable. If s and e interact in a more complex fashion,
debt–or even a single contract–might no longer be optimal. While interesting, an analysis of
this case is beyond the scope of this paper.
5.3 Signal-Dependent Optimal Investment Levels
In Section 3.4 we pointed out that the optimality of a single contract depends on a number of
assumptions, most notably the assumption that the investment size k is fixed. One can easily
think of situations where a fixed investment is not a good assumption. For instance, the optimal
investment size might depend on the productivity of the project, and hence on the lender’s
signal. In what follows, we analyze this case in more detail.
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Our main finding is that, while a single debt contract is generally no longer optimal, the
optimal menu consists exclusively of debt contracts. The intuition is similar to Section 3, except
that there are now two distortions: s∗ > sFB and/or k(s) 6= kFB(s) for some s ≥ sFB.33 Consider
two incentive-compatible menus that implement the same investment schedule k(s) and cutoﬀ
signal s∗. One of them, menu D, consists exclusively of debt contracts while the other, menu
ND, does not. For the same reason as in Section 3 where a single debt contract minimized the
lender’s information rent Us(t)− Us∗(t) for all s > s∗, the lender’s expected information rent is
lower under the menu of debt contracts, D. Since s∗ and k(s) are the same under both menus,
the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is higher under D. If the borrower’s participation constraint binds
under ND, it must therefore be slack under D. This slack can be used to improve eﬃciency–
i.e., to either lower the cutoﬀ signal s∗ by increasing the repayment R in the “cutoﬀ contract”
and/or implement a more eﬃcient investment schedule k(s)–until the borrower’s participation
constraint binds.34 Call this adjusted menu of debt contracts D0. In the end, the borrower
is equally well of under ND and D0. The latter, however, is more eﬃcient, which implies the
lender’s expected payoﬀ is higher under D0.
To verify this intuition formally, let us modify our setup as follows. Given some signal s
and investment size k > 0, let Gs(x | k) and µs(k) denote the project’s conditional cash-flow
distribution and conditional expected cash flow, respectively. We assume that the corresponding
density gs(x | k) > 0 is continuously diﬀerentiable in s and k over x ∈ [x, x]. For k = 0 we
specify µs(k) = 0. Moreover, we assume that µs(k) is strictly quasiconcave in k given s, which
implies µs(k) − k is also strictly quasiconcave. We finally assume that µs(k) − k has a unique
finite maximum kFB(s) for all s.
Given that Gs(x | k) satisfies MLRP, µs(k) is strictly increasing in s for given k > 0, which
immediately implies that µs(kFB(s)) − kFB(s) is strictly increasing in s if kFB(s) > 0 and
nondecreasing otherwise. Similar to our basic model in Section 3, we assume that µs(kFB(s))−
kFB(s) is positive for suﬃciently high s and negative for suﬃciently low s, implying that there
33This is true provided V > 0. If V = 0 the first best can be attained, i.e., s∗ = sFB and k(s) = kFB(s) for all
s ≥ sFB . See the Appendix for details.
34When adjusting the repayment associated with the cutoﬀ debt contract t(x, s∗) one must at the same time
also adjust the repayments at higher signals s > s∗ to preserve incentive compatibility.
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exists a unique first-best cutoﬀ signal 0 < sFB < 1 satisfying35
µsFB (kFB(sFB))− kFB(sFB) = 0. (15)
A menu of contracts consists of pairs {k(s), t(x, s)} prescribing an investment level k(s) and a
repayment t(x, s) for each (reported) signal s. Let Us(t(x, s), k(s)) :=
R
X t(x, s)gs(x | k)dx−k(s).
As t(x, s) is nondecreasing in x by Assumption 2 and Gs(x | k) satisfies MLRP, it follows
immediately from previous arguments that the lender’s optimal accept or reject decision is
characterized by a cutoﬀ rule.36 If we (again) rule out the trivial case where the lender always
rejects, there then exists a unique cutoﬀ signal 0 < s∗ < 1 satisfying
Us∗(t(x, s
∗), k(s∗))− k(s∗) = 0. (16)
Given that the optimal accept or reject decision is characterized by a cutoﬀ rule, we can write
the lender’s problem as follows. At time τ = 0 the lender chooses a menu T := {t(x, s), k(s)} to
maximize her expected payoﬀ
U(T ) :=
Z 1
s∗(T )
[Us(t(x, s), k(s))− k(s)]f(s)ds, (17)
subject to her incentive-compatibility constraint
Us(t(x, s), k(s))− k(s) ≥ Us(t(x, s0), k(s0))− k(s0) for all s, s0 ≥ s∗, (18)
the borrower’s ex-ante participation constraint
V (T ) :=
Z 1
s∗(T )
[µs(k(s))− Us(t(x, s), k(s))]f(s)ds ≥ V , (19)
the optimality condition (16), and the requirement that t(x, s) be nondecreasing.37
35Existence of sFB follows from continuity of µs(kFB(s))− kFB(s), which follows from continuity of Gs(x | k)
and the maximum theorem.
36 If the lender’s expected payoﬀ under the contract (k(s), t(x, s)) is positive at some signal s, it remains positive
under the same contract at all higher signals by Assumption 2. If the lender optimally selects a diﬀerent contract
at higher signals, her expected payoﬀ may be higher (by optimality), but never lower.
37 In Section 3.1 incentive compatibility is ensured by Us(T ) := maxti∈T us (ti) . As a menu now consists of
two instruments, t and k, it is simpler to write the incentive-compatibility constraint as in (18). Note that the
restriction to s ≥ s∗ is without loss of generality. Alternatively, we could extend the notation to all s by specifying
that k(s) = 0 for s < s∗.
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To characterize the optimal repayment schedule t∗(x, s), it is not necessary to fully solve (16)-
(19). (In particular: it is not necessary to derive the optimal investment schedule k∗(s).) As
the following result shows, in any optimal menu T ∗ the associated optimal repayment schedule
t∗(x, s) must consist exclusively of debt contracts.38
Proposition 9. The optimal menu consists exclusively of debt contracts.
Proof. See Appendix.
6 Conclusion
With few exceptions, credit decisions are subjective and hence discretionary.39 Discretion, in
turn, implies that the lender’s incentives to accept or reject depends on the value of her claims,
and thus on the security in place. We show that the lender is generally too conservative in the
sense that she rejects too often. The optimal contract minimizes this ex-post ineﬃciency. The
unique optimal contract is debt. Debt minimizes the lender’s losses from bad projects, thus
minimizing her excessive conservativism and inclination to reject.
We also show that the fine-tuning of loan terms after interim information might not be
optimal. In principle, the lender could oﬀer a menu from which she selects a contract after
obtaining information about the project. Since the lender has discretion, she would always
pick the contract that is ex-post optimal for her, however. This “self-dealing” undermines the
lender’s commitment to leave the borrower as much payoﬀ as possible in good states, which is
necessary to maximize her own payoﬀ in bad states. Hence, the same feature that makes debt
optimal–namely, maximization of the lender’s return in bad states–makes a menu not optimal.
Instead, it is optimal to oﬀer a single contract and either reject or accept the borrower on the
basis of this contract. (As we show in Section 5.3, this might not true if the investment size is
state-dependent, however.) Our results might help explain the use of standardized loan terms
in conjunction with quantity rationing found in certain lending situations
38The problem (16)-(19) is not amenable to standard solution techniques. In a standard mechanism design
problem (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, Chapter 7)) monetary transfers are separable from allocative decisions.
In our model, this would imply that t is a lump-sum transfer that depends on s but not on k. From our previous
analysis, however, we know that t optimally depends on x, which in turn depends on Gs(x | k) and thus on k.
39One exception is automated credit scoring as used, e.g., by credit card companies.
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What makes our lender special is her ability to weed out lemons. In other investment situa-
tions, the characteristic ability of investors may be a diﬀerent one. For instance, it is frequently
argued that what distinguishes a venture capitalist from a bank is the venture capitalist’s exper-
tise to coach projects. The optimal contract in this case is to give the venture capitalist equity
or equity-linked securities, like convertibles. In practice, ex-ante and ex-post incentives often
cannot be separated, however. Banks, for instance, typically engage in ex-post monitoring while
venture capitalists also engage in ex-ante screening. Exploring this tension between screening
(which tends to favor debt) and ex-post incentives (which tends to favor equity) in a unified
framework appears to be an interesting avenue for future research.
In the United States, banks are generally forbidden to hold significant equity stakes in nonfi-
nancial firms. In this regard, Berlin (2000) asks: “Are U.S. banks’ borrowers at a disadvantage
because their lenders are too cautious when evaluating project risks and too harsh when a bor-
rower experiences financial diﬃculties?” In our model, lenders are indeed too cautious. But
this is not because they hold debt, but because they cannot extract the full surplus from their
borrowers. On the contrary, it is debt, not equity, that makes lenders the least cautious. Given
that our setting is based on specific, and possibly restrictive, assumptions, one must be cautious
in drawing policy implications, however.
7 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. If t(x) is a constant, we have that t(x) ≤ x < k. But this implies that
us(t) < k for all s ≤ 1, which implies that the lender rejects for all s. Conversely, if t(x) is
increasing over sets of positive measure, Assumptions 1 and 2 together with continuity of gs(x)
in s imply that us (t) is continuous and strictly increasing in s. There are two cases: if u1(t) ≤ k
the lender rejects for all s, while if u1(t) > k she accepts if and only if s > s∗ ∈ (0, 1) , where
s∗ > 0 follows from u0 (t) ≤ µ0 < k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The case where V = 0 is trivial. If the lender extracts the full
surplus, the unique optimal security is t(x) = x for all x (or debt with repayment R = x). The
rest follows from Proposition 1.
Suppose V > 0. The statement regarding s∗ follows from Proposition 1. In the following, we
show that for any (nondecreasing) non-debt contract t = t(x) we can construct a debt contract
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t˜ = t˜(x) that satisfies the borrower’s participation constraint (3) and is strictly preferred by the
lender. Holding the cutoﬀ signal fixed at s∗(t), choose t˜ such that it generates the same expected
payoﬀ for the lender as t. Accordingly, t˜ is uniquely defined byZ 1
s∗(t)
∙Z
X
z(x)gs(x)dx
¸
f(s)ds = 0, (20)
where z(x) := t˜(x) − t(x). As the cutoﬀ signal is fixed and the lender’s expected payoﬀ is the
same under t and t˜, the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is consequently also the same under t and t˜.
As t˜ 6= t and the lender’s conditional expected payoﬀ is continuous in s under both t and
t˜, (20) implies that there exists at least one signal s0 satisfying s∗(t) < s0 < 1 such thatR
X z(x)gs0(x)dx = 0. Moreover, as t is nondecreasing and t˜ is a debt contract, this further-
more implies that there exists a cash flow xˆ ∈ (x, x) such that z(x) ≥ 0 for all x < xˆ and
z(x) ≤ 0 for all x > xˆ, where both inequalities are strict over sets of positive measure. As
Gs(x) satisfies MLRP and s∗(t) < s0, it follows that gs∗(t)(x)/gs0(x) is strictly decreasing in x.
Consequently, Z
X
z(x)gs∗(t)(x)dx
=
Z xˆ
x
z(x)gs0(x)
gs∗(t)(x)
gs0(x)
dx+
Z x
xˆ
z(x)gs0(x)
gs∗(t)(x)
gs0(x)
dx (21)
>
gs∗(t)(xˆ)
gs0(xˆ)
∙Z
X
z(x)gs0(x)dx
¸
= 0,
where the last equality follows from the definition of s0.
Since
R
X z(x)gs∗(t)(x)dx > 0, we have thatZ
X
t˜(x)gs∗(t)(x)dx >
Z
X
t(x)gs∗(t)(x)dx = k,
where the equality follows from the definition of s∗(t). In words: The lender’s conditional ex-
pected payoﬀ at s = s∗(t) is positive under the debt contract t˜ but zero under the non-debt
contract t (by the definition of s∗(t)). As
R
X t˜(x)gs(x)dx is strictly increasing in s, this implies
that
R
X t˜(x)gs∗(t˜)(x)dx = k for some s
∗(t˜) < s∗(t), i.e., the cutoﬀ signal implemented by t˜ is
strictly lower than the cutoﬀ signal implemented by t.
To wrap up, given some arbitrary non-debt contract t, we have constructed a debt contract t˜
such that, if the cutoﬀ signal was fixed at s∗(t), the lender and borrower have the same expected
payoﬀ under both contracts. However, under t˜ the borrower is additionally accepted at signals
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s ∈ (s∗(t˜), s∗(t)], which implies both the lender and borrower benefit from switching to t˜. This
proves that any optimal contract must be debt.
Uniqueness is straightforward. As the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is continuous in R, there
exists for each V a compact set of R−values at which the borrower’s participation constraint
binds. As the lender’s expected payoﬀ is increasing in R, the largest value in this set uniquely
defines the optimal debt contract t∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. As Us(T ) is the maximum over a set of continuous and nonincreasing
functions, it is continuous and nonincreasing in s. Lemma 2 thus carries over to the case with
a menu, i.e., the optimal credit decision is characterized by a unique cutoﬀ signal s∗(T ). The
case where V = 0 is trivial. If V > 0 the menu cannot contain t(x) = x, for then the lender
would always choose this contract, thus violating V > 0. But if t(x) = x is not in the menu,
Proposition 1 holds, which implies there exists a unique cutoﬀ signal s∗(T ) > sFB.
We now have two cases. In one case the menu T is not feasible (Case 1 ). In the other
case we can lower the cutoﬀ signal by replacing T with the unique optimal debt contract t∗
from Proposition 2. Since the borrower’s participation constraint is satisfed under t∗ (Proof of
Proposition 2, last paragraph), the lender is consequently better oﬀ (Case 2 ).
Case 1. Suppose t∗ ∈ T and s∗(T ) = s∗(t∗). In words: The menu contains the optimal debt
contract, and this contract determines the cutoﬀ signal s∗(T ). We now show that if t∗ is not
chosen for almost all s > s∗, then T must violate the borrower’s participation constraint (1).
If t∗ is not chosen for almost all s > s∗, there exists some t 6= t∗ in T and some sˆ satisfying
s∗(T ) ≤ sˆ < 1 such that usˆ(t) ≥ usˆ(t∗), i.e., t is weakly preferred to t∗ after observing the
signal sˆ. But this implies that t must be strictly preferred to t∗ for all s > sˆ. The argument is
analogous to that in the Proof of Proposition 2. Define z(x) := t∗(x) − t(x). Since t∗(x) is a
debt contract and t(x) is nondecreasing, there exists some xˆ ∈ (x, x) such that z(x) ≥ 0 for all
x < xˆ and z(x) ≤ 0 for all x > xˆ, where the inequalities are strict over sets of positive measure.
By MLRP of Gs(x), we then obtain for s > sˆ thatZ
X
z(x)gs(x)dx <
gs(xˆ)
gsˆ(xˆ)
∙Z
X
z(x)gsˆ(x)dx
¸
= 0,
which completes the argument. Since us(t) > us(t∗) for all s > sˆ, and s∗(T ) = s∗(t∗), the
lender’s expected payoﬀ from oﬀering the menu is strictly greater than from oﬀering only t∗,
i.e., U(T ) > U (t∗) . But since the cutoﬀ signal is the same, i.e., s∗(T ) = s∗(t∗), the borrower’s
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expected payoﬀ must be lower, i.e., V (T ) < V (t∗) . However, by the construction of t∗ (Proof
of Proposition 2, last paragraph), we have that V (t∗) = V , implying that V (T ) < V .
Case 2. Suppose s∗(T ) 6= s∗(t∗), which covers all cases not covered in Case 1. In this case,
we can straightforwardly apply the logic in the Proof of Proposition 2 and show that replacing
T with a single contract t∗ makes the lender strictly better oﬀ. Consider the “cutoﬀ contract”
tˆ ∈ T defined by s∗(T ) = s∗(tˆ). (If there are several such contracts in the menu, take one of
them.) Next, delete all contracts t 6= tˆ from the menu. By construction, the cutoﬀ signal s∗(tˆ)
remains unchanged. Moreover, as the lender (weakly) prefers the deleted contracts over tˆ for
some s ≥ s∗(tˆ), but the cutoﬀ signal remains unchanged, the borrower is not made worse oﬀ.
That is, his participation constraint (1) remains satisfied after the deletion. We can then use the
argument in the Proof of Proposition 2 and replace the remaining contract tˆ with the optimal
debt contract t∗. This lowers the cutoﬀ signal while the borrower’s participation constraint binds
under t∗. The lender is consequently better oﬀ by replacing T with t∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. In the following, we use the term “positive oﬀer” to denote an oﬀer
by the market at τ = 1 under which attracted borrowers receive a positive payoﬀ. To simplify
the exposition, we make use of an observation in the Proof of Proposition 3 that for any menu
T the optimal credit decision follows a simple cutoﬀ rule. The acceptance set Ω(T ) is thus some
interval [s∗, 1] , where s∗ = s∗(T ).
The case where µ ≤ 0 is straightforward. Since any positive market oﬀer which attracts
accepted borrowers also attracts all rejected borrowers, the expected NPV from financing a
borrower visiting the market at τ = 1 can be at most µ.40 Given that the market must break
even, it therefore cannot make a positive oﬀer. The same holds at τ = 0. Accepted borrowers
thus optimally stay with the lender, which implies we are back to our basic setup with V = 0.
At τ = 0 the lender optimally oﬀers t∗(x) = x, which provides the borrower with an expected
payoﬀ of zero.
In the remainder of this proof, we consider the case where µ > 0. We first consider Case 1
where Vmax > µ. The proof proceeds in several steps. We first prove an auxiliary result stating
that if the market can make a positive oﬀer (under which it breaks even) at τ = 1, then the
40Since µ ≤ 0 rejected borrowers must have a negative expected NPV. This implies that there cannot exist a
market oﬀer that is separating and generates zero profit, since rejected borrowers would inevitably be attracted
by the oﬀer.
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lender’s expected payoﬀ at τ = 0 cannot be positive (Step 1 ). We subsequently show that the
constellation described in the proposition is an equilibrium (Steps 2a-c). We finally show that
the equilibrium is unique (Step 3 ).
Step 1. Suppose at τ = 1 an accepted borrower stays with the lender’s with probability 1−ξ,
while with probability ξ ∈ [0, 1] he takes the market oﬀer. Evidently, a rejected borrower always
takes a positive market oﬀer. Accordingly, the expected NPV of financing a borrower visiting
the market at τ = 1 is
Vˆ :=
ξ [1− F (s∗)]
ξ [1− F (s∗)] + F (s∗)
Z 1
s∗
[µs − k]
f(s)
1− F (s∗)ds (22)
+
ξF (s∗)
ξ [1− F (s∗)] + F (s∗)
Z s∗
0
[µs − k]
f(s)
F (s∗)
ds,
where
R 1
s∗ [µs−k]
f(s)
1−F (s∗)ds is the expected NPV of an accepted borrower, while
R s∗
0 [µs−k]
f(s)
F (s∗)ds
is the expected NPV of a rejected borrower. Given that the market makes zero profit, Vˆ is also
what borrowers visiting the market at τ = 1 will get on average.
Since µ > 0 projects are viable on an ex-ante basis. Consequently, at τ = 0 the lender must
oﬀer the borrower an expected payoﬀ of at least µ > 0. Given the borrower’s decision at τ = 1,
his ex-ante participation constraint is
(1− ξ)
Z 1
s∗
[µs − Us(T )] f(s)ds+ [ξ [1− F (s∗)] + F (s∗)] Vˆ ≥ µ. (23)
Inserting (22) in (23), the latter transforms to
(1− ξ)
Z 1
s∗
[Us(T )− k] f(s)ds ≤ 0,
which implies that, regardless of ξ, the lender’s expected payoﬀ at τ = 0 is nonpositive. (If (23)
binds, the lender’s expected payoﬀ is zero.) Intuitively, if the market makes a positive oﬀer at
τ = 1, the project gets always financed–either by the lender or by the market. But this implies
that the total surplus just equals the ex-ante NPV µ. Since µ is also what the lender must leave
the borrower to satisfy his participation constraint, the lender makes no profit. Put diﬀerently,
if projects always get financed the lender provides no value added. But if the lender provides
no value added, her profit in a competitive credit market must be zero.
Step 2a. We next show that if the market does not make a positive oﬀer at τ = 1, the lender’s
maximization program coincides with that in Section 3.1, which implies that the unique optimal
oﬀer is t∗. (The remaining statements in Proposition 4 are then immediate.) The argument is
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straightforward. If the market does not make a positive oﬀer at τ = 1, an accepted borrower
always stays with the lender, while a rejected borrower obtains a payoﬀ of zero. Moreover, since
projects are viable ex ante, the lender must oﬀer the borrower at least µ > 0. The borrower’s
ex-ante participation constraint is thenZ 1
s∗
[µs − Us(T )] f(s)ds ≥ µ,
which coincides with (1) for V = µ and Ω(T ) = [s∗, 1] (on the latter, see above). The rest follows
from the analysis in Section 3.
To prove that the constellation described in the proposition is an equilibrium, we must also
show that the converse is true, i.e., if the lender oﬀers t∗, the market cannot make a positive oﬀer
at τ = 1. Specifically, we will show that (i) even under the “most optimistic beliefs” the market
cannot make an oﬀer which attracts accepted borrowers (Step 2b), and (ii) rejected borrowers
have a negative NPV (Step 2c). Together, Steps 2b-c imply that if the lender oﬀers t∗, the
market cannot make a positive oﬀer at τ = 1.
Step 2b. Since any market oﬀer attracting accepted borrowers also attracts all rejected
borrowers, the “most optimistic beliefs” are those where–besides all rejected borrowers–all
accepted borrowers visit the market at τ = 1. By definition, these are the prior beliefs F (s).
Given these beliefs, the expected NPV of a borrower visiting the market at τ = 1 is µ. Let tm
denote the contract oﬀered by the market.41 For the market to break even, tm must satisfyZ 1
s∗
[µs − us(tm)] f(s)ds+
Z s∗
0
[µs − us(tm)] f(s)ds = µ, (24)
i.e., borrowers visiting the market at τ = 1 must receive on average µ. Consider next the optimal
debt contract t∗. By construction (see Section 3.1), t∗ satisfiesZ 1
s∗
[µs − us(t∗)] f(s)ds = µ. (25)
Since
R s∗
0 [µs − us(tm)] f(s)ds > 0, (24) and (25) together (after dividing through by 1−F (s∗))
imply that Z 1
s∗
[µs − us(t∗)]
f(s)
1− F (s∗)ds >
Z 1
s∗
[µs − us(tm)]
f(s)
1− F (s∗)ds. (26)
41Below we show that if the lender oﬀers t∗, rejected borrowers have a negative NPV. Again, this then implies
that there cannot exist a market oﬀer that is separating and generates zero profit.
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The left-hand side is the expected payoﬀ of an accepted borrower under t∗, while the right-hand
side is the expected payoﬀ of an accepted borrower under tm.42 Hence an accepted borrower
prefers t∗ over tm even though tm is the highest possible market oﬀer, i.e., the oﬀer under which
the market breaks even if and only if it attracts–in addition to attracting rejected borrowers–
also attracts all accepted borrowers.
Step 2c. The lender’s expected payoﬀ under t∗ isZ 1
s∗
[us(t
∗)− k] f(s)ds > 0,
where the sign follows from us∗(t∗) = k and the fact that us(t∗) is increasing in s by Assumptions
1 and 2. In conjunction with (25), this implies thatZ 1
s∗
[µs − k] f(s)ds > µ.
Since µ :=
R 1
s∗ [µs − k] f(s)ds+
R s∗
0 [µs − k] f(s)ds, this implies that
R s∗
0 [µs − k] f(s)ds < 0, and
therefore that Z s∗
0
[µs − k]
f(s)
F (s∗)
ds < 0, (27)
i.e., the expected NPV of financing a rejected borrower is negative.43 In a certain sense, Step
2c is the mirror image of Step 1. Starting out from the fact that the lender makes a positive
profit, it shows that a rejected borrower cannot obtain financing by the market. Step 1 shows
the converse, i.e., if a (rejected) borrower can obtain financing by the market, the lender cannot
make a positive profit.
Step 3. It remains to establish uniqueness. Evidently, there cannot exist an equilibrium in
which the lender oﬀers T 6= t∗ and the market makes a positive oﬀer at τ = 1. As was shown
in Step 1, the lender would then make zero profit, whereby by oﬀering t∗ she makes a positive
profit (Steps 2b-c.) There also cannot exist an equilibrium in which the lender oﬀers T 6= t∗
and the market does not make a positive oﬀer at τ = 1. As was shown in Step 2a, if the market
does not make a positive oﬀer at τ = 1, the unique optimal oﬀer is t∗. This completes the proof
of Case 1 in Proposition 4 (Vmax > µ).
42Since an accepted borrower knows he was accepted, his beliefs regarding his own type (signal) have the density
f(s)/[1− F (s∗)] for s > s∗ and zero otherwise.
43 If the lender oﬀers t∗, the market knows from Step 2b that a borrower visiting the market must have been
rejected. The expression in (27) is the NPV of financing a borrower conditional on knowing that he was rejected.
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As for Case 2 (Vmax < µ), if the lender approves a loan with positive probability, strict
monotonicity of Us(T ) implies that she realizes a strictly positive expected payoﬀ. We know
from Step 1 that in this case the market cannot make a positive oﬀer at τ = 1. Consequently,
if the lender makes an oﬀer under which the borrower is approved with positive probability, the
borrower’s expected payoﬀ from approaching the lender is strictly less than Vmax. The borrower
can, however, realize µ > Vmax by immediately turning to the market. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof makes use of the following auxiliary result.
Claim 1. Take a debt contract t(x) and some other contract et(x) 6= t(x) such that Usˆ(et) ≥ Usˆ(t)
holds for some sˆ < 1. Then it must hold that Us(et) > Us(t) for all s > sˆ.
Proof. The argument follows the logic of Proposition 2. We argue to a contradiction and
suppose that at some s > sˆ we have Us(et) ≤ Us(t). By continuity of Us(t) and Us(et), this–
together with Usˆ(et) ≥ Usˆ(t)–implies the existence of some es where sˆ < es < s and Ues(et) = Ues(t).
Next, Ues(eT ) = Ues(T ), together with Assumption 2 and the fact that t(x) is debt implies the
existence of some value 0 < ex < x such that t(x) ≥ et(x) for all x < ex while t(x) ≤ et(x) for all
x > ex, where the inequalities are strict on sets of positive measures. By Assumption 1 we thus
have–in analogy to the proof of Proposition 2–that
Usˆ(et)− Usˆ(t) < gsˆ(ex)
ges(ex) £Ues(et)− Ues(t)¤ = 0,
which yields a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Consider first the case where the borrower oﬀers some contract et(x) to replace the optimal
(debt) contract t∗(x). If the lender prefers et(x) over t∗(x) for some sˆ, then she strictly preferset(x) for all s > sˆ by Claim 1. Consequently, the borrower can only be better oﬀ under et(x)
if it lowers the cutoﬀ signal, i.e., if s∗(et) < s∗(t∗). In this case, the loan is approved under
the new contract for all s ≥ s∗(et), implying that the oﬀer is profitable for the borrower only if
V (et) ≥ V (t∗). Existence of some contract et(x) where V (et) ≥ V (t∗) and s∗(et) < s∗(t∗) would
contradict the optimality of t∗ in the lender’s original problem, however.
If the lender makes the oﬀer we have a signaling game. For the sake of brevity, we restrict
attention to equilibria where in case of indiﬀerence, the borrower accepts the lender’s oﬀer. We
argue to a contradiction and suppose that in a given equilibrium there is a nonempty set of
accepted new contracts denoted by T . Denote by eT the union of T and the optimal (debt)
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contract t∗(x). In this equilibrium, the loan is approved for all s ≥ s∗( eT ). Denote by et(x)
one possible contract that is chosen at s = s∗(eT ). By our previous arguments, we know that
unless s∗(eT ) < s∗(t) we cannot have an equilbrium where the borrower accepts the lender’s
oﬀer. By Claim 1, it then follows that all lenders with signals s > s∗(eT ) strictly prefer to
oﬀer a new contract. Moreover, in equilibrium they will oﬀer their most preferred contract
from the set T , which implies the upper boundary for the borrower’s payoﬀ in the equilibrium
under consideration is given by T = et(x). By our previous arguments, however, the borrower’s
expected payoﬀ will then be strictly less than V (t), which implies he rejects. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. In the following, we prove the optimality of debt for the borrower’s
(interim) moral hazard problem. The rest follows from the argument in the main text.
Suppose, to the contrary, that some non-debt contract t(x) was optimal. We can then find
a unique debt contract t˜(x) such thatZ x
x
[t˜(x)− t(x)]g(x | s, eh)dx = 0. (28)
By Assumption 2, there exists a value xˆ ∈ (x, x) such that t˜(x) − t(x) ≥ 0 for all x < xˆ and
t˜(x)− t(x) ≤ 0 for all x > xˆ, where both inequalities are strict over sets of positive measure. We
then have thatZ x
x
[t˜(x)− t(x)]g(x | s, el)dx =
Z x
x
[t˜(x)− t(x)]g(x | s, eh) g(x | s, el)
g(x | s, eh)dx (29)
>
g(xˆ | s, el)
g(xˆ | s, eh)
Z x
x
[t˜(x)− t(x)]g(x | s, eh)dx
= 0,
where the last two lines follow from Assumption 1a and (28), respectively. From this it follows
that the expected agency rent (14) is strictly lower under t˜(x). It remains to show that the
borrower’s incentive-compatibility constraint (13) is satisfied under t˜(x). Using (28) together
with (29), we have thatZ x
x
[t˜(x)− t(x)] [g(x | s, eh)− g(x | s, el)] dx < 0,
implying that (13) is satisfied. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. For a given schedule of investment levels k(s), define µˆs := µ(s, k(s))−
k(s), Uˆs := Us(t(x, s), k(s)) − k(s), and Vˆs := Vs(t(x, s), k(s)). By standard arguments, the
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menu is incentive compatibile if Uˆs is strictly increasing, continuous, and a.e. diﬀerentiable
for all s ≥ s∗. The corresponding local condition requires that dUˆs/ds = ∂Uˆs/∂s at points of
diﬀerentiability. We begin with two auxiliary results.
Claim 1. If V > 0 the first-best outcome cannot be attained.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that V > 0, s∗ = sFB and k(s) = kFB(s) for all s ≥ s∗. Next,
observe that if t(x, s) = x for some s ≥ s∗, it must hold that dVˆs/ds = 0. To see this, note
that incentive compatibility in conjunction with t(x, s) = x implies dUˆs/ds = ∂Uˆs/∂s = ∂µˆs/∂s.
Since k(s) = kFB(s), we have (by the envelope theorem) dµˆs/ds = ∂µˆs/∂s, which implies
dUˆs/ds = dµˆs/ds and therefore dVˆs/ds = 0. Moreover, s
∗ = sFB implies t(x, s∗) = x and
therefore Vˆs∗ = 0. Together with the first observation, this implies that Vˆs = 0 for all s ≥ s∗,
contradicting V > 0. Q.E.D.
Claim 2. For any k > 0, sˆ < 1, debt contract t˜(x), and non-debt contract t(x) satisfying
Usˆ(t, k) ≥ Usˆ(t˜, k), it holds that
dUs(t, k)
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=sˆ
>
dUs(t˜, k)
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=sˆ
. (30)
Proof. Diﬀerentiability of Us follows from diﬀerentiability of gs(x | k). If Usˆ(t, k) = Usˆ(t˜, k) the
claim follows immediately from Claim 1 in Proposition 6. As for the case Usˆ(t, k) > Usˆ(t˜, k),
consider the uniquely defined debt contract tˆ(x) given by Usˆ(t, k) = Usˆ(tˆ, k) (which implies that
Usˆ(tˆ, k) > Usˆ(t˜, k)). Since
dUs(t, k)
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=sˆ
>
dUs(tˆ, k)
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=sˆ
by Claim 1 in Proposition 6, it remains to show that
dUs(tˆ, k)
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=sˆ
≥ dUs(t˜, k)
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=sˆ
. (31)
Partial integration yields Us(t˜, k) = eR−R eRx Gs(x | k)dx. As Rˆ > eR, (31) holds if dGs(x | k)/ds <
0 for all k > 0, x ∈ (x, x), and s, which holds by Assumption 1. Q.E.D.
We are now in the position to show that any optimal menu must contain only debt contracts.
We argue to a contradiction. Suppose some menu T = {t(x, s), k(s)} with corresponding cutoﬀ
s∗ is optimal but some contracts in the menu are non-debt contracts.
Claim 3. Consider two incentive-compatible menus with the same cutoﬀ s∗ and investment
schedule k(s). One of them, eT = {t˜(x, s), k(s)}, consists exclusively of debt contracts while
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the other, T = {t(x, s), k(s)}, does not (on a set of positive measure). It then holds that
Us(t(x, s), k(s)) ≥ Us(t˜(x, s), k(s)) for all s ≥ s∗, with strict inequality for all s > sˆ ≥ s∗.
Proof. The proof follows almost immediately from Claim 2. Let sˆ ∈ [s∗, 1) denote the first
signal s ≥ s∗ for which T prescribes a non-debt contract, t(x, sˆ). We can replace t(x, sˆ) with the
uniquely defined debt contract t˜(x, sˆ) given by Usˆ(t(x, sˆ), k(sˆ)) = Usˆ(t˜(x, sˆ), k(sˆ)). By Claim 2
and local incentive compatibility, we then have that
∂Us(t˜, k(sˆ))
∂s
¯¯¯¯
s=sˆ
<
∂Us(t, k(sˆ))
∂s
¯¯¯¯
s=sˆ
.
We continue this procedure for all other s > sˆ for which T prescribes non-debt contracts. For
signals s > s∗ for which T prescribes debt contracts we simply take those. In the end, we obtain
an incentive-comaptible menu of debt contracts eT with the same cutoﬀ signal and investment
schedule as T satisfying
∂Us(t˜, k(s))
∂s
≤ ∂Us(t, k(s))
∂s
for all s ≥ s∗, with strict inequality for some s ≥ sˆ on sets of positive measure. As dUs/ds =
∂Us/∂s by local incentive compatibility and Us∗(t(x, s∗), k(s∗)) = Us∗(t˜(x, s∗), k(s∗)) by con-
struction, integrating yields Us(t(x, s), k(s)) ≥ Us(t˜(x, s), k(s)) for all s ≥ s∗, with strict in-
equality for s > sˆ ≥ s∗. Q.E.D.
In words: starting from an arbitrary, incentive-compatible menu T we have constructed an
incentive-compatible menu eT of debt contracts such that s∗ and k(s) are the same under both
menus but the borrower’s participation constraint (19) is relaxed. In analogy to the Proof of
Proposition 2, we can now fine-tune eT–either by improving s∗ and/or k(s)–until (19) binds.
Call this adjusted, final menu of debt contracts Tˆ . As the borrower is no better oﬀ under Tˆ
compared to T (if (19) binds under T he is equally well oﬀ, otherwise he is worse oﬀ), but Tˆ
has a lower cutoﬀ signal and/or a more eﬃcient investment schedule than T , the lender must
be strictly better oﬀ under Tˆ .
The argument proceeds in two steps. First, we change the investment schedule from k(s)
to kˆ(s) := (1 − γ)k(s) + γkFB(s) by increasing γ. For each increase in γ, we must adjust the
corresponding repayments in the menu to preserve incentive compatibility and to ensure that
Us∗(tˆ(x, s
∗), kˆ(s∗)) = kˆ(s∗) holds. Note that, by strict quasi-concavity of µs(k), µs(kˆ(s))− kˆ(s)
is nondecreasing in γ and strictly increasing in γ for all s with k(s) 6= kFB(s). Moreover, all
expected payoﬀs change continuously in γ.
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We now have two cases. In Case 1 the borrower’ participation constraint (19) becomes
binding at some γ ≤ 1, which concludes the proof. Conversely, if (19) remains slack at γ = 1 (in
which case we have the first-best investment schedule kFB(s)), we are in Case 2. By Claim 1,
it must then hold that s∗ > sFB. We can consequently increase the repayment associated with
the cutoﬀ debt contract–thereby lowering the cutoﬀ signal–until (19) becomes binding. (To
preserve incentive compatibility, we must also increase all remaining repayments in the menu,
and to remain at the first-best investment level we must specify k(s) = kFB(s) for all “newly
added signals”.) By Claim 1, (19) must eventually bind at some signal s∗ > sFB. Irrespective
of whether Case 1 or 2 obtains, we have constructed an incentive-compatible menu of debt
contracts Tˆ at which the borrower’s participation constraint (19) binds and that implements a
more eﬃcient investment schedule and/or a lower cutoﬀ signal than the original menu T. Q.E.D.
8 Appendix B: Numerical Example in Section 4.3
The ex-ante project NPV µ is
µ =
Z 1
0
µsf(s)ds− k = ln
µ
S
S − 1
¶
− k,
where µs = 1/(S − s) and f(s) = 1 from the uniform distribution. The lender’s expected payoﬀ
conditional on the signal s is then (using partial integration)
us(t) =
Z R
0
xgs(x)dx =
1
S − s [1− e
−(S−s)R].
It follows that the lender’s privately optimal cutoﬀ signal s∗ is given by
1− e−(S−s∗)R
S − s∗ = k,
which implies that
R =
− ln[1− (S − s∗)k]
S − s∗ . (32)
Note that s∗ is strictly decreasing in R with s∗ → sFB = S − 1/k as R → ∞. Finally, the
borrower’s expected payoﬀ from going to the inside lender is
V (t) =
Z 1
s∗
[µs − us(t)]f(s)ds =
Z 1
s∗
1
S − se
−(S−s)Rds, (33)
where R and s∗ satisfy (32).
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To obtain Vmax we must maximize (33) with respect to R subject to (32). Since R enters in
(33) both directly and indirectly via s∗, and hence via (32), we cannot express Vmax in closed
form. Instead, we must solve for Vmax numerically; the results are shown in Figure 1.
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